The Wall & The Bridge: A Global Discourse on Protectionism

An International Joint Academic Session

The Department of Statistics and Data Science, in collaboration with the Department of Computer Science at CHRIST (Deemed to be University), Pune Lavasa Campus, recently hosted a prestigious international joint session titled “The Wall & The Bridge: A Global Discourse on Protectionism.” This scholarly exchange was organized in partnership with the Berlin School of Economics and Law (BSEL), Germany, marking a significant milestone in the campus’s commitment to fostering global academic synergy and cross-cultural intellectual development.

The session, conducted virtually via Google Meet, served as a bridge between two distinct academic environments, bringing together second-year BSc Economics & Statistics students from CHRIST Lavasa and Master’s students from Berlin. By blending the analytical rigor of data science with the theoretical depth of international economics, the event aimed to dissect one of the most pressing challenges of the 21st century: the tension between global integration and rising protectionist sentiments.

Foundational Perspectives and Strategic Context

The discourse was inaugurated by Dr. Avichal Sharma, who provided a comprehensive overview of the current global economic landscape. Dr. Sharma’s address moved beyond simple definitions, situating protectionism within the "New Normal" of post-pandemic recovery and shifting geopolitical alliances. He emphasized that protectionism—often manifested through tariffs, quotas, and subsidies—is rarely a purely economic decision but rather a strategic maneuver within the high-stakes arena of international relations.

By introducing the audience to the strategic behavior of nations, Dr. Sharma laid the groundwork for the session’s focus on Game Theory. He explained how countries often find themselves in a "strategic interdependence," where the economic success of one nation is inextricably linked to the policy choices of its neighbors. This introduction was vital in shifting the students' perspective from viewing trade as a static flow of goods to viewing it as a dynamic, interactive competition.

Following this, the academic depth was further enhanced by Dr. Jennifer Pédussel from the Berlin School of Economics and Law. Dr. Pédussel led an advanced theoretical discussion that centered on the Prisoner’s Dilemma framework as applied to trade policy. She meticulously broke down the mechanics of the Nash Equilibrium, illustrating a scenario where two nations, acting in their own perceived self-interest, choose to impose tariffs.

Dr. Pédussel’s analysis highlighted the paradox of protectionism: while a single country might gain a temporary advantage by taxing imports (improving its Terms of Trade), the inevitable retaliation from partners leads to a "race to the bottom." This results in significant deadweight efficiency losses and a reduction in global welfare, leaving all parties worse off than they would have been under a free-trade regime.

The Tariff Setting Game: Theory in Action

The hallmark of the session was its transition from passive listening to experiential learning through a structured Tariff Setting Game. This simulation was designed to mirror real-world economic complexities, requiring students to apply mathematical models to practical decision-making.

Simulation Structure: Students were organized into bilateral trade groups, representing competing nations.

Objective: Each group aimed to maximize its "National Welfare Function," which balanced consumer surplus, producer surplus, and government tariff revenue.

The Process: Over several rounds, students had to decide whether to maintain low "cooperative" tariffs or pivot to high "protectionist" barriers.

The results of the simulation were profound. In the initial rounds, many groups attempted to maximize revenue through aggressive tariff hikes. However, as the "neighboring countries" retaliated in subsequent rounds, the students observed a sharp decline in their respective national welfare scores. This iterative process provided a vivid, real-time demonstration of a Tariff War. By the end of the game, the participants had reached a practical understanding of the Nash Equilibrium—a point where no country could improve its position by changing its strategy alone, despite the collective outcome being suboptimal.